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Abstract 
Due to historical and geographical reasons, the Baltic States are strongly connected to the power (electricity) 
transmission grids of Russia and Belarus. Current energy security and energy independence targets in the EU 
trigger seeking for alternative power sources for the Baltic. 
Knowing that, a power system model of the Baltic States has been developed and validated with the purpose of 
providing comparative options for a reliable and secure development of the Baltic electricity system. The analysis 
of horizon 2020 and 2030 showed that the dependency of Baltic States on the outside resources is fairly low, 
provided that the expansion of the electricity system goes as planned. 
 
Title: The Baltic Power System between East and West Interconnections 
 
 The Baltic States are strongly connected to the electricity transmission grids in Russia and Belarus 
 The current policy activities are focused on secure energy supply alternatives 
 To support these activities a Baltic power system model has been developed 
 The power model can serve as a tool for techno-economic power system analysis 
 Dependency of the Baltic States on outside resources has been found to be fairly low in 2020/30 
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2 
Executive summary  
 
Policy context  
The energy policy of the Baltic States is integrated in the energy strategy of the 
European Union (EU) and aims at pursuing three major objectives: competitiveness, 
sustainable development and security. All the three Baltic power systems are working to 
fulfil the planned EU technical requirements and to adopt the European regulations, 
codes and standards, e.g. from the European Network of the Transmission System 
Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E), and from the European Committee for 
Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC). 
The integration of the Baltic States into the EU energy market has been identified as a 
strategic priority for all three countries. The main goal of the Baltic Energy Market 
Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) is to create a Baltic Sea region unified market. The current 
implementation of a joint wholesale electricity market for the entire Baltic States is the 
driving force for the energy market development in the Baltic States. 
The power systems of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Baltic Integrated Power System) 
are currently operated - as a synchronous grid - in parallel with the Integrated/Unified 
Power System (IPS/UPS) of Russia and Belarus. The Baltic power systems still lack 
adequate electricity connections, both between themselves and to other parts of the EU. 
However, the situation is improving: recently, the Estlink 1 and 2 connections between 
Estonia and Finland, the LitPol Link connection between Lithuania and Poland and the 
Nordbalt connection between Sweden and Lithuania have considerably raised the 
transfer capacity between the Baltic and the EU electricity markets. 
 
Key conclusions  
A power system model of the Baltic States has been developed with the purpose of 
assessing comparative options for a reliable and secure development of the region's 
electricity system. The model consists of buses with voltage of 110 kV and higher, 
mainly 110 kV, 220 kV and 330 kV. The 35 kV undersea cables connecting the Estonian 
mainland and the north-western islands were also included. The model has been 
calibrated based on the 2014 reference scenario to match the historical records from 
ENTSO-E. 
The cross-border power flows in the Baltic model are close to the recorded ENTSO-E data 
in winter off-peak load and summer peak load scenarios. Two additional scenarios 
(winter peak load and summer off-peak load) were examined. Line loading and voltage 
levels within the Baltic States are within the acceptable range in all 2014 reference 
scenarios. The Baltic States usually exported electricity to mainland Russia but imported 
from Kaliningrad and Belarus. From the perspective of the Baltics, the dependence on 
Russia is fairly low in terms of electric power. 
Lithuania’s network infrastructure is adequate and can sustain large quantity of 
imports. The hydro pump station is important for the shifting of generation resources, 
and thus plays a key role in reducing the system marginal cost. 
The Latvian power system exploits considerable market advantages due to the high ratio 
of renewable energy - mainly hydro - in its electricity generation mix. In the reference 
scenario Latvia is a net exporter. However, the network seems not as adequate as that 
of Lithuania. Sometimes, congestion can cause the increase of the system marginal cost. 
The Estonian network may occasionally experience lower voltages compared with the 
other two Baltic State power systems, especially when the Estlinks (interconnecting 
Estonia with Finland) are under heavy load conditions. Reactive compensations may be 
needed, particularly around the area of Tallinn. Even though the installed wind turbine 
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capacity is the highest among the three Baltic States, this is still not enough to give 
Estonia the same strategic market position as Latvia. 
The analysis of the horizons 2020 and 2030 showed that the dependency of the Baltic 
States on foreign electricity production is fairly low, provided that the expansion of 
generation resources goes ahead as planned. 
The cross-border transmission corridors inside the Baltic States are sufficient to sustain 
the electricity consumption patterns assumed in the scenarios considered; however, the 
internal network projects should be fostered to remove congestion, especially in the 
northern part of Estonia and the area South-West of Riga. 
 
Main findings  
First security analyses were carried out, based upon the aforementioned input data, 
modelling and scenario assumptions, to identify the most critical contingencies for the 
Baltic power system. 
The most critical contingencies for the 2030 scenario with and without the nuclear 
generator in Visaginas (Lithuania) are listed in the two tables below. Each table 
quantifies contingencies for four sub-scenarios (cases): (i) winter off-peak, (ii) winter 
peak, (iii) summer off-peak, and (iv) summer peak. 
Additional analyses are expected to be carried out, in cooperation with the relevant 
stakeholders, to complement these studies and to combine the modelling efforts 
towards attaining an integrated overview of the Baltic power and market operation and 
development challenges. 
Without Visaginas reactor 
Cases 
Contingency 
component 
Most severe 
consequence 
Violations 
Unserved 
loads (MW) 
Disconnected 
generation (MW) 
Maximum 
overload (%) 
Minimum 
Voltage (p.u.) 
Winter 
off-peak  
contingency 18 Disc. Gen. 0 0 13.83 - - 
contingency 2 Num. violations 45 0 0 115 0.867 
contingency 11 Low voltage 6 0 0 - 0.799 
contingency 5 Uns. loads 0 16.07 0 - - 
contingency 3 Overload 36 0 0 236 0.817 
Winter 
peak 
contingency 2 Num. violations 34 0 0 142.7 0.811 
contingency 9 Overload 3 0 0 161.2 - 
contingency 11 Low voltage 9 0 0 102.5 0.593 
contingency 5 Uns. Loads 0 25.61 0 - - 
contingency 18 Disc. Gen. 0 0 23.91 - - 
Summer 
off-peak 
contingency 14 Overload 2 0 0 150.5 - 
contingency 12 Disc. Gen. 0 0 13.33 - - 
contingency 5 Uns. loads 0 13.72 0 - - 
Summer 
peak 
contingency 3 Overload 37 0 0 242.7 0.808 
contingency 18 Disc. Gen. 0 0 14.29 - - 
contingency 11 Low voltage 9 0 0 - 0.783 
contingency 5 Uns. loads 0 22.37 0 - - 
contingency 2 Num. violations 51 0 0 118.6 0.861 
With Visaginas reactor 
Cases 
Contingency 
component 
Most severe 
consequence 
Violations 
Unserved 
loads (MW) 
Disconnected 
generation (MW) 
Maximum 
overload (%) 
Minimum 
Voltage (p.u.) 
Winter 
off-peak 
contingency 16 Disc. Gen. 0 0 928.2 - - 
contingency 2 Num. violations 45 0 0 115 0.868 
contingency 11 Low voltage 6 0 0 - 0.799 
contingency 5 Uns. loads 0 16.07 0 - - 
contingency 3 Overload 36 0 0 236 0.817 
Winter 
peak 
contingency 2 Num. violations 35 0 0 142.9 0.811 
contingency 9 Overload 4 0 0 161.2 - 
contingency 11 Low voltage 9 0 0 102 0.59 
contingency 5 Uns. Loads 0 25.61 0 - - 
contingency 16 Disc. Gen. 0 0 1286.22 - - 
Summer 
off-peak 
contingency 14 Overload 2 0 0 150.5 - 
contingency 16 Disc. Gen. 1 0 928.2 115.2 - 
contingency 5 Uns. loads 0 13.72 0 - - 
Summer 
peak 
contingency 3 Overload 37 0 0 243.8 0.808 
contingency 16 Disc. Gen. 0 0 928.2 - - 
contingency 11 Low voltage 8 0 0 - 0.786 
contingency 5 Uns. loads 0 22.37 0 - - 
contingency 2 Num. violations 50 0 0 119.1 0.861 
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Related and future JRC work  
The Joint Research Centre, as European Commission’s in-house science service, 
performs independent scientific research and support EU policy-making on 
transformations towards secure, smarter and interoperable electricity systems. 
To this aim, we continuously develop models, methodologies and carry out experimental 
work to understand the evolution of the European transmission and distribution grids 
towards super and smart grid concepts (a complete overview is available on the website: 
http://ses.jrc.ec.europa.eu/). 
As an example, we recently thoroughly assessed the need for investment in electricity 
interconnectors in Europe between 2010 and 2025, and the impact of cross-border 
transmission capacity on curtailment needs for RES, on hydro storage utilisation and on 
security of supply (in terms of energy not served). [1] 
The preliminary techno-economic analyses in the current report pave the ground for 
more detailed market analyses, expected to be conducted with tailored market/power 
dispatch tools to support electricity system development policies and initiatives in the 
Baltic States. Different geo-political options and scenarios for higher security of energy 
supply and energy independence are in the process of being defined and assessed with 
the relevant actors, particularly in the BEMIP context. 
 
Quick guide  
One common goal of the Baltic States is greater energy supply independence through 
the diversification of primary energy sources. Due to the countries’ limited ability to act 
on their own – especially on large, costly projects – joint efforts are needed. 
The present report gives an insight in the ability of the Baltic States to operate their 
electricity systems independently of the neighbouring countries. The results show that by 
2020 and 2030 the dependency of the Baltic States on the outside generation resources 
is fairly low, following current electricity system development trends.  
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1. Introduction  
The interconnection of the power systems of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (Baltic 
Integrated Power System, BIPS) operates as a synchronous Alternating Current (AC) 
grid in parallel with the Integrated/Unified Power System (IPS/UPS) of Russia and 
Belarus. This is performed via a ring created in the early sixties of the last century by 
interconnecting the power systems of the western part of the former Soviet Union: the 
Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), north-western Russia, Central Russia and 
Belarus. The Russian power system provides primary power reserves for the frequency 
regulation to the whole system. 
The backbone of the BIPS is formed by 330 kV high-voltage power lines. There are 58 
high-voltage transmission lines with a total length of 4137 km, and 32 substations 
equipped with 54 autotransformers (347/242kV, 330/115kV) with a total capacity of 
8665 MVA. The regional transmission network of the Baltic IPS consists primarily of 
110 kV lines, with the exception of the Estonian power system, where 220 kV lines are 
also present. 
The electricity systems of the Baltic States are tightly interconnected and integrated into 
the BRELL (Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), that operates synchronously 
with the UPS/IPS zone. The transmission lines feature voltages spanning from 110 kV to 
330 kV and stretch over more than 17000 km. Jointly with the neighbouring electrical 
networks of Russia and Belarus, the electrical networks of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
form the “Baltic Ring”, consisting of 330 and 750 kV lines. The 750 kV lines in the 
integrated power system are generally operated as antenna connections (open-loop). 
The operation of the Baltic Ring was based on the guidelines shared by the ten power 
systems of north-western Soviet Union (Kola, Karelia, Leningrad, Novgorod, Pskov, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kaliningrad and Belarus), and proved effective to ensure high 
reliability [2]. The 330 kV lines are equipped with fast relays and single-phase auto-
reclosers (providing restoration within one second in 80% of single-phase non-
permanent faults). Various emergency control schemes allow for the temporary increase 
of the line flow limits of the ring’s 330 kV lines in case of emergency. The generation 
reserve is provided by automatic run-up (or halt) pumping stations; predefined plans for 
reducing demand by curtailing/disconnecting electricity consumers are also in place. 
Each system in the ring represents an autonomous section, characterised by certain 
values for maximum power transfer capability to other sections according to the rated 
voltage, the number, the length and the protection schemes of the transmission lines. 
From the stability point of view, a characteristic feature of the closed electrical ring is 
that the stability break (i.e. opening of the BRELL ring without compromising electricity 
system stability) is possible only in two electrical sections together. Electrical sections 
can be mutually variable, meaning that they may feature several combinations, for 
example: Leningrad – Estonia and Smolensk – Belarus, or Estonia – Latvia and Smolensk 
– Belarus, etc. The base for combination is the place of origin of the fault with active 
power flow limitation, provided that, in two corresponding electrical sections, the overall 
power flow reaches the maximum permissible level according to the steady state 
stability criterion. Of course, the advantages of the electrical ring are also visible here, 
because the transfer capacities fulfilling the steady state and transient stability criteria 
for the sum of two electrical sections are always higher compared to the corresponding 
transfer capacity values for one electrical section taken in isolation. 
Developing emergency control schemes challenge the operation principles of the 
electrical ring. One should therefore consider that, based on their administrative division, 
the power systems of the electrical ring belong to different independent sovereign 
countries: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus and the Russian Federation. The main task 
in this issue can be, cooperating in a global scale, to secure power system parallel 
operation in all cases, so that the compliance with the steady state and transient 
stability criteria does not require breaking the ring. Of course, when priority is given to 
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splitting certain regional power grids from the electrical ring for isolated operation, some 
exceptions may well be possible. 
A key fact is that the problems of the electrical ring cannot be solved locally, i.e. within 
the particular power systems, because such solutions are neither technically effective 
nor economically reasonable, and do not ensure power supply reliability. In the case of a 
global solution, local emergency control scheme selection principles would also undergo 
substantial changes. 
The power generation landscape in the Baltic States changed dramatically at the 
beginning of 2010, when the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (1500 MW) in Lithuania was 
shut down (in 2009 it produced around 10000 GWh, almost 40% of the overall 
consumption of the Baltic States). A new nuclear power plant in Visaginas (1350MW) is 
under consideration, with an investment of about 7 G€ and a construction time of 10 
years. 
In 2013, generation in Estonia was mainly characterised by large thermal power plants 
(Eesti, Balti and Iru), with a total generation of 11892 GWh/year and renewable sources, 
mainly wind power, accounting for 451 GWh/year. In Latvia two main energy resources 
were exploited: hydro produced 2912 GWh/year (Pļaviņu, Rīgas, Ķeguma, Aiviekstes 
hydro power stations), and fossil fuels accounted for 2869 GWh/year (Riga Combined 
Heat and Power plants – CHP-1 and CHP-2). Whereas wood and wind power plants 
contributed with 119 GWh/year. The Lithuanian generation capacity consisted of 
hydropower and pumped storage power plants for 1066 GWh/year (Kaunas and Kruonis 
plants); gas, black fuel or oil for 2615 GWh/year (Vilnius, Mazeikiu, Kaunas and 
Elektrenai power plants); and wind produced 649 GWh/year. 
The availability of primary energy sources for electricity production and the dependence 
from abroad is different for the various Baltic States. Estonia’s energy independence is 
90%, whereas the value is 48% for Latvia, and of 19% for Lithuania. 
Besides the interconnections with Russia and Belarus, the three Baltic States are 
interconnected with the Western European Countries through Estlink1 and Estlink2 
(Finland). For the reinforcement of the electricity infrastructure in the region several 
projects are under consideration, including: 1) an interconnector between Lithuania and 
Sweden (NordBalt, 2016, 700MW); 2) the Lithuania-Poland (LitPol) interconnection (the 
first 500 MW line was put in operation in 2015, whereas the second 500MW line is 
planned for 2020); 3) various internal Baltic interconnectors listed as projects of 
common interests [3]. 
The energy policy of the Baltic States is integrated in the energy strategy of the EU and 
must pursue three major objectives: competitiveness, sustainable development and 
security. All three Baltic power systems are working to fulfil the EU technical 
requirements and adopt the European regulations, codes and standards (ENTSO-E, 
CENELEC...). 
The integration of the Baltic States into the EU energy market has been identified as a 
strategic priority for all three countries. The main goal is to create a unified market of 
the Baltic Sea region. Current implementation of a joint wholesale electricity market for 
the entire Baltic States has boosted energy market development in the Baltic States. So 
far, "energy-only" markets are established in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The day-
ahead (Elspot) and intraday (Elbas) electricity markets have been set up, employing 
implicit auctioning of cross-border transmission capacity. Baltic States have national 
balancing markets, which are organised by the national Transmission System Operators 
(TSO) in charge of balancing their areas. After the Ignalina shutdown, a generation 
surplus arose in the northern part of the Baltic States, while a deficit emerged in the 
southern part causing power transfers from Estonia to Latvia with the overloading of tie-
lines. During summertime, the related congestion causes the market to split into two 
price-zones, with the exploitation of more expensive local capacity and import from 
abroad. 
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The Baltic States are considering how to optimise their mix of generation resources, 
defining priorities at the individual and common levels with one common goal: Greater 
energy independence. Due to their limited ability to act on their own, especially on large, 
costly projects, joint efforts are expected.  
With this report, we provide a contribution to the assessment of electricity security in the 
Baltic States for both the current state, and a set of possible future scenarios, in terms 
of generation capacity, generation mix and network enhancement (both internally and 
with respect to new tie-lines). We will use a detailed steady state model of the Baltic 
States’ power system, with a simplified representation of the interconnected networks 
developed in-house by the Joint Research Centre (JRC)/ the Institute for Energy and 
Transport (IET) in cooperation with the Institute of Physical Energetics in Riga and 
Politecnico di Torino. 
 
2. Geo-political and infrastructural security  
Electricity is a crucial commodity for the welfare of modern societies. The provision of 
electricity depends on the decisions of various players (policy decision makers, 
regulators and their associations, system operators and their associations, etc.) in 
different fields (economic, technical, strategic, etc.) at multiple scales (local, national, 
regional) and with reference to various time frames (from real-time to long term). 
From the electricity point of view, the function of the power systems is the provision of 
the electricity required to meet demand at all points in time, in such a way that all 
customers (residential, industrial, tertiary and public service) are supplied with the 
needed amount of electricity at the required locations following the required power 
profile (with or without the possibility from the demand side to control the power profile 
itself) in different time frames. The provision of electricity must be reliable in the sense 
that the level of probability to provide the service (i.e. supply the loads) is high. 
In order to be reliable, the system needs to be secure (with reference to the sources and 
the operation of the infrastructure) and adequate (with reference to energy conversion 
and electricity infrastructure). Adequacy in electricity systems signifies the ability of the 
electric system to supply the aggregate electrical demand satisfying all customers at all 
times under normal operating conditions. It further implies: 
 Generation/import adequacy: availability of generation and import capacity to 
meet demand in the various timeframes. Measured by a set of different indices, 
such as Net Generation Capacity (NGC), Reliably Available Capacity (RAC).  
 Network adequacy: ability of the network to transfer the needed power from 
sources to sinks. 
Power system security refers to the ability of the system to continuously fulfil its function 
against possible adverse situations. Power system can be vulnerable to threats that, 
when materialised, may cause foreseeable and unforeseeable disruption. The threat 
against power systems can be classified into natural, accidental, malicious and systemic. 
Natural threats are caused by not controllable natural forces (earthquakes, tsunamis, 
hurricane...). Accidental threats are caused by the failure of network devices or wrong 
human decisions (operational fault, system equipment failure, accident due to the poor 
management…). Malicious threats are intentional actions to bring damages to the system 
(terrorist, criminal group, cyber attackers, geopolitics…). Systemic threats emerge with 
the evolution of the power system (the integration of renewable energy, and the 
interdependency between power system and other infrastructures). The possibility to 
withstand the materialisation of a threat into an adverse event are usually considered  
under operational security in terms of the ability to withstand perturbations reacting to 
external, abnormal perturbations due to natural/accidental and malicious events to keep 
the system’s feasibility. From a strategic perspective, special consideration can be 
devoted to the security of energy resources as the ability to assure the accessibility, in 
the various timeframes, of primary sources to be converted in the power plants to meet 
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the required total amount of electricity and geopolitical security as the ability to assure 
the availability of primary sources and/or electricity imports against unilateral intentional 
disruption by international players outside the considered region. It is obvious that 
geopolitical conflict is a malicious human threat. 
Manifestly, the electricity security is related to different factors and the analysis of it 
should take all of them into account along with their inter-relations, i.e. from the origin 
(threats), the materialised disturbances to the source and/or to the network 
infrastructure (contingencies) to the end user. 
Besides the above mentioned components of the system (i.e., generation and network), 
the demand can also play an increasing role in assuring “electricity security” by helping 
to provide load reductions to match with falls in supply at different time frames. The new 
paradigm of electricity systems, with its shift from relatively passive to active 
distribution systems, may provide new challenges and also new opportunities for power 
system security.  
In current power system terminology, time frames can be articulated into several 
horizons serving partly different purposes: 
 Real-time: ranging from just a few seconds to 15 minutes, this time window is 
employed to “instantaneously” balance demand with supply for the “on-line 
control” of power plants and transmission systems. Conventional sources are 
assumed to be available, while renewables are considered as intermittent.  
 Short-term: usually referring to the period from a day to a few days, it is 
routinely employed for market based unit commitment/ dispatch and generation 
scheduling in the day-ahead market or in the adjustment market. The standard 
assumption within this timeframe, therefore, is that conventional sources may 
suffer disruptions. 
 Mid-term: ranging from a month to a couple of years, it is used for yearly 
bilateral negotiation or contractual trades. For the security analysis in this time 
frame, infrastructure capacity is typically assumed to be constant. 
 Long-term: covering the period from a year to a few decades, this is the 
standard horizon for energy policy planning and infrastructure reinforcement. In 
this time frame, then, new capacity can be built, or newly built lines can be put 
into service. Unlike in the previous time frames, here the non-renewable sources 
may be depleted. 
The considered time frames for the availability of the energy sources for the Baltic 
States in this report are: 2014 (present situation), 2020 and 2030, respectively. The 
scenarios will be differentiated with reference to the evolution and characterisation of 
generation, such as type, availability (planned, commissioned, decommissioned, etc.), 
and the transmission grid expansion, such as new internal lines and cross-border 
interconnections. Further, for the purpose of analysing the impacts of geopolitical 
threats on the Baltic States’ electricity security, the following elements will play a 
fundamental role throughout our study: 
 Electricity sources: the place of origin of different types of sources (primary 
sources or direct import of electricity), such as Russia, the EU, or local. 
 Capacity adequacy: the availability, capacity and flexibility of the generation units 
needed to match demand 
 Transmission system adequacy: the projected network after the commissioning 
of new internal lines and interconnections to transfer power from sources to 
sinks. 
 Geopolitical security: the way of the operation of the system: with or without 
synchronous connection to either Russia or Continental Europe Network, or in an 
island mode. 
 Technical security: the assessment of the grid operational security (e.g. via the 
n-1 criterion). 
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3. Generation adequacy assessment  
3.1 Current situation  
The generation adequacy for the three Baltic States is assessed based on the best 
available public data from the local TSOs, along with Nord Pool Spot’s and ENTSO-E’s 
adequacy forecasting [3-8]. The key parameters for generation adequacy are 
summarised in the Table 1, in accordance with the standard methodology of the Union 
for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) [10]. In fact, the assessment 
of the actual generation adequacy reflects the ability of the generating units to match 
demand for an indicative load reference point (peak hour of 16th January 2013). The 
methodology is based on a deterministic approach, to calculate the Remaining Capacity 
(RC) that results from the difference between the RAC and the expected peak load. 
Table 1 Main metrics/variables for generation adequacy assessment 
Generation adequacy key Definition 
Net Generation Capacity (NGC) The sum of the individual NGC of all power stations 
connected to either the transmission grid or the 
distribution grid. 
Adequacy Reference Margin (ARM) Defined as the sum of a fraction of the NGC (5%) and the 
margin against the peak load, aimed to compensate the 
time synchronisation of the reference load point and the 
peak load. 
Unavailable Capacity (UC) The sum of the system service reserve, the outage 
generation, overhauls and non-useable capacity (wind, 
hydro, network congestion…). 
Reliably Available Capacity  (RAC) The remaining NGC after deducting the unavailable 
capacity. 
Remaining Capacity (RC) The difference between the RAC and the reference load. A 
potential for export is characterised by a RC higher than 
the ARM while a dependence on import is characterised by 
a RC lower than the ARM. 
 
 
Figure 1 Generation adequacy on winter peak day  
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Figure 1 summarises the current generation adequacy perspective for the Baltic States. 
As may be seen, all countries present RCs higher than the ARM, implying adequate 
generation supply with a potential for electricity export to third countries. Individually, 
Estonia presents the highest potential for export (with 660 MW of RC), while Latvia and 
Lithuania did present very marginal RC. 
Among the three Baltic States, Lithuania seems the most vulnerable in terms of 
generation adequacy as an effect of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) 
decommissioning, with a shortage of 150~180 MW generation capacity during the 2014 
winter peak, and a 130~160 MW deficit at the summer peak. Even in the case of 
generation sufficiency, Lithuania would still depend on imports, as 71% of the electricity 
consumed in 2013 is being imported (50% originated from third countries) [5][11], due 
to higher local generation prices. While wind generation in Lithuania can supply 15% of 
peak demand the volatility of renewable generation and the risk of icing during the 
winter peak call for further assessment of generation adequacy based on stochastic 
methodologies. 
With a 2.6 GW Net Generation Capacity, the Estonian power system is able to cover the 
peak loads and also allow net exports to Latvia, Russia and Finland in case of favourable 
electricity prices, with 32% of the electricity generated in 2013 being exported mainly to 
Russia and Latvia. Despite the high NGC with respect to the annual load peak demand in 
Latvia and Lithuania, the RC is clearly limited due to the high share of hydro generation 
in both countries resulting in significant UC during peak demand. In fact, Latvia’s water 
inflow shortage (mainly in the Daugava River [12]) imposes severe constraints during 
the first six weeks of the year which, as a consequence, are characterised by inadequate 
generation adequacy. In terms of exports, Latvia is a net exporter to Lithuania, while it 
still has considerable dependence on imports from Estonia and Russia, reaching 38% of 
load in the first semester of 2013. 
 
 
Figure 2 Maximum winter power flows (MW) between countries in the region 
(2013/2014)  
All in all, the Baltic States are still depending on the imports from third countries 
(Russia, Belarus). Latvia/Russia cross-border tie-lines were loaded at 75% in 2013, with 
Latvia prevailing as net exporter. The Estonia-Russia interconnections, on the other 
hand, are the least loaded (18% in 2013) where, mainly Estonia is exporting. In 
absolute terms, the three Baltic States seem able to balance their energy supply and 
demand during a typical winter peak. This is depicted in Figure 1, where in practice only 
Estonia prevails as a net exporter.  
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In this sense, the interconnection between the three Baltic States is a key element in 
ensuring the overall stability of the system, where every cross-border section within the 
BRELL network is managed by one TSO in coordination with the relevant counterparts to 
agree on the maximum trading capacity between countries (Figure 2). The Baltic States 
TSOs (Estonia’s Elering AS, Latvia’s Augstsprieguma Tīkls AS, and Lithuania’s Litgrid AB) 
initially adopted (in 2013) a common Baltic internal cross-border trading capacity 
calculation [5] procedure, based on transparent and non-discriminatory rules in a line 
with the principles of the ENTSO-E. However, following a unilateral decision of Litgrid to 
implement their own calculation model, a provisional bilateral new agreement between 
the Latvian and the Estonian TSOs was adopted in 2014. This situation reflects the 
difficulties in implementing a common operational framework for an integrated power 
system, which might have a critical impact on the security and reliability of supply within 
the region. 
 
3.2 Generation adequacy assessment 
The future of electricity security in the Baltic States greatly depends on the strategic 
choices that will be implemented both at the infrastructural and operational levels. The 
crucial elements to be evaluated are (i) the generation side with the development of new 
generation capacity, and consequently of a new energy mix; (ii) the foreseen 
infrastructural enhancements, both internal and cross-border; as well as (iii) the possible 
shift to the autonomous synchronous operation of the Baltic States or a synchronisation 
to the Continental Europe Network. The load’s time variation should be considered as 
well with changes in structure, operation, and load must be set in a coherent time frame. 
For this purpose, the current situation is here compared with two alternative time 
frames: 2020 and 2030. 
 
Figure 3 Net generation capacity evolution scenarios in the Baltic States 
In accordance with the ENTSO-E Scenario Outlook and Adequacy Forecast [4], two main 
scenarios are investigated for the three Baltic States. The two scenarios are built based 
on a bottom-up approach consisting in a first forecasting exercise from the reference 
point (January 2013) until 2020, whose results are successively projected onto the 2030 
horizon. The first scenario (referred to as a “conservative” one) takes into consideration 
only confirmed investments, while the second scenario (referred to as the “best 
estimate” scenario) assumes adequate market incentives and investments credibly 
deemed as “likely”. The load forecasting for the two scenarios is assumed to be similar 
up to the year 2020, based on the best available national demand estimates and 
considering the usual climatic conditions. The two scenario projections diverge on the 
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2020 to 2030 horizon in terms of load forecasting, mainly due to differing the 
assumptions of the gross domestic product: hypothesising more favourable economic 
and financial conditions the best estimate scenario results in higher electricity demand 
and therefore increased need for generation capacity expansion and network 
reinforcements.  
 
Figure 4 Reserve capacity under the two scenarios for the three Baltic states 
Consistently with the present generation adequacy assessment, the mid- and long-term 
assessment of the developed scenarios is based on the UCTE methodology, while the 
data was mainly taken from the ENTSO-E Scenario Outlook and Adequacy Forecast and 
the forecasts of the member TSOs [4]. Table 2 lists the NGC and the RC forecasting for 
each Baltic country and the whole region for the years 2015, 2020 and 2030 under the 
“conservative” and “best estimate” scenarios. Figure 3 and Figure 4 summarises the 
Baltic States’ generation adequacy evolution in terms of NGC and RC, for the two 
assessed scenarios and the three Baltic States. In both scenarios, all countries achieve 
adequate generation capacity, with lower predictions for Estonia under the conservative 
scenario in the 2030 projection. In the following sub-sections, further analyses are 
developed for each country under the two scenarios. 
Table 2 Generation adequacy forecast for the Baltic States 
Country Capacity Conservative scenario Best estimate scenario 
2015 2020 2030 2015 2020 2030 
Estonia 
[GW] 
NGC 3.04 2.94 2.39 3.07 3.37 3.62 
RC 0.60 0.70 0.36 0.58 1.07 0.77 
Latvia 
[GW] 
NGC 2.98 3.33 4.3 3.06 3.55 4.74 
RC 0.39 0.45 0.87 0.47 0.67 1.18 
Lithuania 
[GW] 
NGC 3.94 3.91 4.91 3.94 4.55 6.54 
RC 0.39 0.63 1.67 0.39 0.83 1.35 
All 
[GW] 
NGC 3.94 3.91 4.91 3.94 4.55 6.54 
RC 1.38 1.78 2.9 1.44 2.57 3.30 
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3.2.1 Conservative projection 
The main tenet of the conservative scenario is the Estonian generation capacity 
decrease. In fact, Estonia’s strong dependence on fossil sources will be affected starting 
from 2016, as seen in Figure 5 due to emission limitation directive entering into 
force [13]. However, it is foreseen for both scenarios that Estonia would be nevertheless 
capable of meeting the load by using its local generation capacity: this is due to the 
flexibility provided by the Industrial Emissions Directive [14] in granting exemption for 
power plants part of small isolated networks. Despite the prospect of keeping a few 
combustion power plants, Estonia is still expecting a noticeable decrease in the installed 
generation capacity, with 21.4% decrease between 2015 and 2030. Latvia’s generation 
will assist to the highest increase in installed capacity, with 11.74% increase up to 2020 
followed by 29.13% increase up to 2030, totalling a whopping 44.30% increase with 
respect to the 2015 reference year. The newly installed capacity is mainly composed of 
renewable energy sources, while fossil and hydro generation sources would remain 
similar to the reference year. For Lithuania’s generation capacity, we may assist to a 
slight decrease by 2020 due to emission limitations, followed by a substantial increase of 
25.6% up to 2030 due to the expected commissioning of the Visaginas NPP and the 
considerable investment in wind energy capacity. 
Overall, the three Baltic States should assist to a slight increase in installed capacity by 
2020 in comparison to the reference year, followed by a 16% increase of installed 
capacity on the 2030 horizon, mainly due to Latvia’s expected generation capacity 
investment. For the conservative scenario, the three Baltic States can still individually 
meet their demand using local capacities, with positive generation RC in 2020 and 2030 
(Table 2). 
 
 
Figure 5 Electricity mix for the different scenarios 
In the conservative scenario, all three Baltic States are expected to be beyond the 
European 2020 requirement for generation mix, and hence meet the emissions targets. 
Nonetheless, low penetration scenarios would still require network reinforcement and 
cross-border transmission investments, in order to efficiently integrate RES and reach 
18% of penetration in 2020 (28% target) and 24% in 2030 for all the three Baltic 
States. 
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3.2.2 Best estimate projection 
The best estimate scenario, unlike the conservative one, foresees an increase in 
Estonia’s installed capacity. The largest expansion should take place in the share of RES 
with 15 percentage points (pp): the comparative figures for Latvia and Lithuania are 
instead 3 pp and 5 pp respectively (Figure 5). Consistently with the conservative 
scenario, Estonia is expected to satisfy its electricity demand relying on local generation, 
with positive RC throughout the 2030 horizon. 
Latvia features similar patterns to Estonia, with substantially higher installed capacity 
and adequate RC. Furthermore, its RES share in the generation mix would remain the 
highest among the three Baltic States for both scenarios, with the due consequences in 
terms of low RAC. 
Finally, Lithuania is expected to achieve a sustained improvement of generation 
adequacy, all the while presenting the highest load demand increase for both the 
conservative and the best estimate scenarios, with respectively 35% and 42% load 
growth in the period 2015-2030. The low share of RES in the Lithuanian electricity mix 
could be an obstacle in meeting the 2050 roadmap targets for power generation. The 
best estimate scenario presents higher hydro capacity for Lithuania, with a 42% increase 
compared to the conservative scenario resulting in the highest level of UC per NGC 
within the three Baltic States. 
In general under both scenarios, all the three Baltic States are facing high demand 
growth forecasts, clearly above the ENTSO-E average for January 2030. While the 
generation adequacy assessments for all scenarios are projecting adequate RCs, further 
need for cross-border interconnections with ENTSO-E members is clearly expected, in 
preparation to the higher energy independence from the UPS/IPS. Furthermore, 
requirements to meet the 2050 roadmap for CO2 emissions and gradual 
decommissioning of fossil fuel generation power plants will result in the expected 
increase of offshore wind farms deployment, requiring an efficient market design and 
effective power balancing reserves. In this prospect, cross-border transmission capacity 
would specifically play a crucial role in the security of supply, by balancing the high 
volatility of wind power resources. 
 
4. Steady state models of the Baltic power systems  
By definition, a steady state model requires the following elements: 
 a set of buses, to which transmission branches are connected; for each of these 
buses, at least the voltage value is required; 
 the topology of the network, complete with branch parameters (i.e. lines & 
transformers); 
 a set of calibrated generation units; 
 a set of values for expected load. 
Starting from a legacy dataset with 899 buses, 1216 lines, 42 generators and 310 loads, 
a series of validations were performed to check its consistency, including: 
 reactance/resistance ratio and short circuit impedance for transformers, to 
identify conflicting impedances and inconsistent rated capacities; 
 reactance/resistance ratio, characteristic impedance, relationship of line thermal 
limit for transmission lines, to discover impedance errors and inconsistent thermal 
limits; all the thresholds used to identify errors were compared with the Russian 
Standard “GOST 839-1980” for transmission lines; 
 geographic information to identify topological problems, etc. 
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Identified errors were corrected either through iterations with experts in the Baltic States 
or by applying standard parameters. As a next step, a thorough list of current generation 
units and future foreseen investment inside the Baltic States was created with necessary 
information such as geographic locations, connected substations, technical limits, fuel 
types, technologies, etc. A quadratic cost curve was assigned to each unit (see Section 
4.2). The curve was used to determine the system marginal cost in the subsequent 
simulation. 
 
4.1 Reference models 
The basis for assessment of future horizons is the construction of an AC power flow 
model calibrated and validated through reference to ENTSO-E’s physical system 
snapshots for the current situation (2014). Four reference scenarios representing the 
Baltic States’ electricity system in 2014 were considered:  
 Winter off-peak load (15-Jan 03:00) 
 Winter peak load (15-Jan 11:00) 
 Summer off-peak load (16-July 03:00) 
 Summer peak load (16-July 11:00) 
The load flow of the network model was compared with the historical records of the 
physical cross-border flows reported by ENTSO-E [15]. 
According to the ENTSO-E consumption data inquiry for 2014 [4], the total consumption 
of each Baltic country was extracted for the above-mentioned scenarios (see Table 3). 
The load in Table 3 is “net consumption”, i.e., it excludes power plants' auxiliaries but 
includes network losses; therefore, the maximum output of an individual generator was 
subtracted by its self-consumption. The load distribution among the nodes of the 
electricity grid was kept unchanged in proportional terms, but simply scaled up/ or down 
according to the assumption on the overall load for each country [4]. 
Table 3 Load for the reference 2014 scenarios for each Baltic country (MW) 
Country Winter off-peak Winter peak Summer off-peak Summer peak 
Estonia 887 1289 568 908 
Latvia 678 1116 519 902 
Lithuania 1001 1598 856 1396 
Total 2566 4003 1943 3206 
 
Table 4 Components of the reference model 
Country Buses Lines Loads Generators 
Estonia 189 256 137 30 
Latvia 242 317 150 16 
Lithuania 480 644 293 21 
Russia 4 4 0 8 
Belarus 5 5 0 10 
Finland 2 2 0 4 
Sweden 1 1 0 2 
Poland 2 2 0 4 
Kaliningrad (Russia) 1 1 0 2 
Total 926 1232* 580 97 
*tie-lines not included 
The reference transmission system model for Baltic States consists of lines/branches 
with voltage of 110 kV and higher, mainly 110kV, 220kV and 330 kV. In order to connect 
the north-west islands of Estonia, such as Hiiumaa, the 35kV undersea cables for future 
connection of offshore wind farms in Estonia were also included. Table 4 reports the 
main features of the reference models in terms of the numbers of modelled components. 
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The quantity of generators and net installed capacity (excluding self-consumption) 
included in the power model of the Baltic States are listed in Table 5 and are classified 
by the primary sources. 
Table 5 Power plants in the Baltic States arranged by fuel or energy source (2014 case) 
Country 
Coal 
Oil 
Shale 
Gas 
Biomass/ 
Waste 
Geothermal Hydro Wind Total 
- MW - MW - MW - MW - MW - MW - MW - MW 
Estonia - - 6 2180 3 190 5 74 - - - - 16 320 30 2764 
Latvia 1 20 - - 5 1024 2 34 - - 4 1550 4 41 16 2669 
Lithuania - - - - 9 2865 2 40 1 35 2 1001 7 149 21 4090 
Total 1 20 6 2180 17 4079 9 148 1 35 6 2551 27 510 67 9523 
It should be noted that generation units belonging to the same power plant were mostly 
grouped as one generator. Relatively small generators connected to the distribution 
networks (e.g. solar power plants in Lithuania) were not modelled. 
Generation capacity values in Table 5 are obtained from the Baltic TSOs: Elering [16], 
Litgrid [17], and AST [18]. Wind farm contribution to electricity system voltage control 
through reactive power injection was applied according to the ENTSO-E regulations [19]: 
-0.35 to 0.4 Q/P. 
The equivalent areas connecting to the Baltic States were modelled by two independent 
generators at each outside terminal bus of a tie-line. In such a way the import/export 
power over a subject tie is simulated. The capacities of the two generators were set 
equal to the transmission capacity of the tie-line. 
 
4.2 Generation costs 
The cost curve of an electricity generator indicates its generation costs at a specific 
power output level. Generation cost (Cgen, €2013/h) as a function of generation power (Pg, 
expressed in MW) is represented as a cost function in Equation 1. 
𝐶𝑔𝑒𝑛(𝑃𝑔) = 𝐶𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑂&𝑀 + 𝐶𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑂&𝑀 × 𝑃𝑔 + 𝐶𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 ∑ (𝐴𝑖 × 𝑃𝑔
𝑖−1)𝑛𝑖=1  (1) 
CfixedO&M and CvarO&M represent fixed and variable Operation and Maintenance (O&M) costs 
for the power plant. These are respectively independent and dependent of the 
generation power, and are measured resp. in €2013/h and €2013/MWh. The cost of fuel 
(Cfuel, expressed in €2013/MMBtu) is multiplied by the summation of n terms, where the 
unit of measurement, MMBtu, is one million of British thermal units. The product of the 
summation shapes the cost curve, so that the generator energy conversion efficiency 
from chemical to electrical (heat rate) at different generation power levels is taken into 
account. n determines the quantity of terms in the polynomial of the summation; e.g., if 
n = 3, the summation is a product of quadratic polynomial: (A1 x Pg
0) + (A2 x Pg
1) + (A3 
x Pg
2). The Ai ’s (MMBtu/MWh) are coefficients in the polynomial. These coefficients 
define the changes in the heat rate of the power plant at various generation powers. 
Fixed and variable O&M costs for the electricity generation technologies most commonly 
found in the Baltic States are obtained from a JRC report [20], and listed in Table 6 for 
2013, 2020 and 2030. Variable O&M costs include neither personnel costs nor fuel and 
CO2 emission costs. Transport related costs for captured CO2 are not included in the O&M 
costs. O&M costs for pumped hydro storage are listed for a storage system with one 
natural reservoir. 
Cost curves vary for different generator technologies and different fuel types. Generators 
powered with freely available renewable energy (i.e. hydro, wind, solar, geothermal) 
have linear cost curve, because the fuel cost is zero (see Eq. 1). On the other hand, 
nuclear fission, fossil-burning, and biomass power plants have positive fuel costs. In this 
case the cost curve is not linear anymore, because the heat rate varies at different 
generation power levels. The Ai coefficients shape the cost curve for power plants where 
fuel costs are applicable. 
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Table 6 Fixed and variable O&M costs, fuel costs, and heat rate (@ maximum electricity 
generation) of different conventional electricity generator technologies for 2013, 2020 
and 2030 [MW and MWh units refer to electric power and energy] 
Fuel/ 
Energy 
source 
Technology Fixed O&M 
costs, 
€2013/MW/h 
Variable O&M 
costs, 
€2013/MWh 
Fuel costs, 
€2013/MMBtu 
Heat rate @max 
electricity 
generation, 
MMBtu/MWh 
2013 2020 2030 2013 2020 2030 2013 2020 2030 2013 2020 2030 
Wind, 
onshore Wind turbine 4.32 3.70 3.26 0.0 0.0 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Wind, 
offshore Wind turbine 14.66 10.52 8.84 0.0 0.0 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Geothermal Flash steam 8.84 9.08 9.18 0.0 0.0 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Hydro 
Hydraulic turbine, 
> 100MW, with reservoir 2.51 2.51 2.51 3.0 3.0 3.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Hydro Pumped hydro storage 2.57 2.57 2.57 0.0 0.0 0.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Natural gas OCGT, conventional 0.88 N/A N/A 13.0 N/A N/A 8.62 N/A N/A 8.97 N/A N/A 
Natural gas OCGT, advanced 1.88 1.88 1.88 11.0 11.0 11.0 8.62 7.89 7.52 8.52 8.52 7.93 
Natural gas CCGT, conventional, CHP 8.54 N/A N/A 2.4 N/A N/A 8.62 N/A N/A 8.12 N/A N/A 
Natural gas CCGT, advanced, CHP 4.50 4.45 4.41 4.0 4.0 4.0 8.62 7.89 7.52 5.98 5.78 5.59 
Oil shale 
Steam turbine, fluidized 
bed 4.34 4.34 4.34 6.0 6.0 6.0 2.81 2.81 2.81 8.12 7.93 7.58 
Coal 
Steam turbine, 
pulverised, supercritical 4.57 4.57 4.57 3.6 3.6 3.6 2.59 2.38 2.24 7.58 7.41 7.10 
Uranium 
Steam turbine, nuclear 
fission, generation III 10.79 10.43 8.89 2.5 2.5 2.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 9.21 9.21 8.97 
Solid 
biomass Steam turbine, CHP 9.64 8.66 7.85 3.3 3.3 3.3 6.50 6.50 6.50 10.03 9.74 9.47 
[Biogas and landfill gas are assumed to be burned in conventional CCGT CHP technologies] 
 
 
Figure 6 Adapted heat rete curves at different generation powers for conventional 
generator technologies 
The Ai coefficients form heat rate curves and are obtained from the study of Lew et al. 
[21]. The heat rate curves for the relevant technologies are presented in Figure 6. It is 
assumed that the drop in the relative values of the heat rate (the increase in the 
chemical-electrical efficiency) is the same for all steam turbine generators. The shape of 
the heat rate curve in Figure 6 is the same for power plants fuelled with coal, lignite, 
uranium, and biomass; however, the absolute heat rate value differs. The shape of the 
heat rate curve for the Open Cycle Gas Turbine (OCGT) and for the Combined Cycle Gas 
Turbine (CCGT) differs from the steam turbine technology. The loss in efficiency at part-
load operation is higher for OCGT and CCGT. When compared with full power generation, 
Conventional OCGT natural gas power plant operating at 50% power needs roughly one 
additional MMBtu to produce one MWh of electricity. The efficiency of the steam turbine 
generation technologies is less affected by a part load operation. The heat rate value for 
different technologies at maximum electricity generation is listed in Table 6. 
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4.2.1 Fuel Price 
Fuel prices for fossil fuel, uranium and biomass are listed in Table 6. Fuel price for 
natural gas (8.62 €2013/MMBtu) is obtained from the Eurostat database [22]. It is an 
average price in 2013 within EU28 for industrial consumers with annual consumption 
between 950,000 MMBtu and 3,790,000 MMBtu. 
Coal price of 2.59 €2013/MMBtu reflects the average steam (thermal) coal price in 2013 in 
North-western Europe [23], assuming coal energy density of 27.8 MMBtu/t (ton of coal 
equivalent). Oil shale price in 2013 (extracted in Estonia) is 2.81 €2013/MMBtu [24] 
@average energy value of 9.57 MMBtu/t [25]. 
Long-term average price for EU28 procurements in 2013 for mined uranium (U3O8) is 
85.19 €2013/kguranium as published by Euratom [26]. Before it is used in a rector, the 
mined uranium is converted, enriched, and fabricated in fuel elements. Following 
Kenneth D. Kok’s methodology [27], the price for fuel element (including the disposal of 
the used fuel) is estimated at 0.75 €2013/MMBtu (enriched UO2 with 4.5% U-235 @burn-
up of fuel of 45 MWthermal-day/kg [28]). 
Solid biomass and renewable waste (mainly wood for both) are the most common 
feedstock for biomass power plants in Europe, covering roughly 70% of plants capacity 
in 2013 [29]. Nowadays, most of biomass power generation is based on combustion 
technologies using steam turbines to set a power generator in motion Pellet and wood-
chips prices for large-scale consumers in North-western Europe vary from 4 to 9 euros 
per MMBtu in 2013 @30% moisture content [30]. The average of the minimum and 
maximum price, 6.5 €2013/MMBtu, is assumed as the cost for biomass in Table 6. 
The gate fee paid by local authorities to energy-from-waste (post-2000) power plants in 
2013/14 varies from 74 to 134 €2013/t [31]. An average value of this range is converted 
in fuel cost unit listed in Table 6 and is equal to -7.43 €2013/MMBtu @mean energy value 
for solid municipal waste: 14 MMBtu/t [32]. The fuel price is negative since the power 
plant receives money for waste treatment. 
Fuel prices for the future scenarios (2020 and 2030) for natural gas and coal are 
updated following the Energy Technology Perspectives 2DS scenario of the International 
Energy Agency [33]. For oil shale, uranium and solid biomass the price is assumed 
constant. 
 
4.3 Cross-border Energy Exchange 
Cross-border energy exchange is limited by transmission line/cable capacity (total 
transfer capacity) based on which other capacity concepts may apply, such as net 
transfer capacity and available transfer capacity. However, since the study conducted in 
this report was on the assumption that all the generator output would be decided by the 
optimal power flow based on the cost introduced before, the net transfer capacity is 
assumed within the Baltic States (considering the necessary security margin for 
emergency reserves and technical uncertainties). At the times when imports/exports are 
needed for power balancing purposes, the power exchange between Baltic and 
neighbouring countries is applied, according to the priority list in Table 7. The priority is 
arranged from high to low. For example, if power imports are required in the Baltic 
States, firstly the power will be imported from Finland. If power imports from Finland are 
not sufficient for power balance, additional power imports will be asked from Russia, and 
so on. Higher priority in Table 7 typically indicates that the import price is likely to be 
lower The priority is estimated based on the generation mix in the neighbouring 
countries [34-37], and on the projected costs of generating electricity [38][39]. 
Finland likely has the lowest electricity generation price among the neighbouring 
countries listed in Table 7, since nearly half of its electricity is generated via a NPP (in 
2015). In Russia, most of the electricity is generated from fossil fuel and uranium power 
plants (around 85% in 2015). Since the generation costs in the mentioned power plants 
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in Russia are slightly lower than in other countries, the overall estimated electricity price 
in Russia falls between Finland and Sweden. Sweden - with 40% of electricity generation 
from uranium, and 42% (2015) from hydro power - follows Russia. Poland, with 86% 
(2015) of electricity generated in coal power plants, is listed after Sweden. Finally, 
Kaliningrad and Belarus close the list as the countries with the highest electricity 
generation costs, due to the fact that most of electricity there is generated in natural gas 
power plants. Belarus imports gas from Russia, and is thus located at the bottom of 
Table 7, after Kaliningrad. 
Table 7 Electricity imports priority in the Baltic States from the neighbouring countries 
Imports priority in Baltic Exporting country 
High 
 
 
 
 
Low 
Finland 
Russia 
Sweden 
Poland 
Kaliningrad 
Belarus 
In order to increase the utilisation of the generators in the Baltic States during times of 
power deficit, the electricity import prices from the neighbouring countries are set much 
higher than the highest price of the local generator. In the case of power surplus in the 
Baltic States, power is exported. In this case the export price for electricity (from Baltic 
to neighbouring countries) is set much lower than the lowest price of the local generator. 
The ranking in Table 7 is reversed for exports since the countries with higher power 
generation costs will likely offer a higher price for electricity from the neighbouring 
countries. For example, the first country for power export from the Baltic States is 
considered Belarus. If the potential for exports is higher than Belarus can absorb, the 
remaining power will be offered to Kaliningrad, and so on. The same exports/imports 
priority ranking is assumed for the future scenarios. 
 
4.4 Technical Characteristics of Generators 
Generation flexibility (as a range from minimum to maximum operation power) is 
presented for technologies, which participate in power balance (Table 8). The generation 
flexibility is expressed in percentage. 100% refers to the gross electrical capacity of the 
power plant. Generation flexibility applies to power plants whose output power can be 
fully or partly regulated. Wind farms and geothermal power plants are not considered for 
power curtailment. Hydro power plants with reservoir can vary their output power 
depending on the water inflow and the size of the reservoir. At high water inflow (in 
winter), these are assumed to be completely flexible (0-100%) for short term (one day) 
power balance; on the other hand, at lower water inflow (in summer), their flexibility is 
limited (from 0% to 50% of gross capacity). It should be mentioned that individual 
generation units in a hydro power plant have relatively low flexibility. For example, 
Plavinas hydro power plant (Latvia) comprises ten units of 89.4 MW. Each unit has 
minimum operation power of 65 MW. Lower operation power may damage turbine due to 
vibrations caused by cavitation. However, since generation units can be run individually, 
the total hydro power plant can be considered completely flexible. Historical monthly 
generation of hydro power plants in Latvia can be found in the records of the Central 
Statistical Bureau of Latvia [40]. Hydro pumped storage and OCGT power plants are fully 
flexible, and can be turned on and off within minutes for power balancing during peak 
loads [41]. Other power plants in Table 8 include steam turbine in their machinery and 
are thus less flexible. CCGT power plant flexibility is assumed to be in a range from 40% 
to 100%, whereas coal, uranium, and biomass powered plants can change their 
generation output from 70% to 100% [1][42] . 
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Table 8 Contribution to power balance expressed as generation flexibility with minimum 
and maximum power; self-consumption (as a percentage of gross electrical capacity); 
and generator availability of different conventional electricity generator technologies for 
all scenario years: 2013-2030 
Fuel/ 
Energy 
source 
Technology Min. 
power, % 
Max. power, % Self-
consumption, 
% 
Availability, 
% CHP off CHP max 
Wind, 
onshore Wind turbine 
N/A N/A N/A 
15 97 
Wind, 
offshore Wind turbine 
N/A N/A N/A 
15 96 
Geothermal Flash steam N/A N/A N/A 4 95 
Hydro 
Hydraulic turbine,  
> 100MW, with reservoir 
0 50-100 50-100 
1 84 
Hydro Pumped hydro storage 0 100 100 20 84 
Natural gas OCGT, conventional 0 100 100 3 95 
Natural gas OCGT, advanced 0 100 100 4 95 
Natural gas 
CCGT, conventional, 
CHP 
40 100 80 
7 93 
Natural gas CCGT, advanced, CHP 40 100 80 7 96 
Oil shale 
Steam turbine, fluidized 
bed 
70 100 100 
5 85 
Coal 
Steam turbine, 
pulverised, supercritical 
70 100 100 
5 90 
Uranium 
Steam turbine, nuclear 
fission, generation III 
70 100 100 
3 90 
Solid 
biomass Steam turbine, CHP 
70 100 80 
10 90 
[For the reference scenario, the minimum power of oil shale is set to 30% to match the historical records] 
CHP plants, when delivering heat for heat consumers, have reduced electricity 
generation efficiency: in fact, their higher heat rate limits the maximum electrical power 
which the plant can generate. It is assumed that CHP plants, in full power operation and 
at maximum thermal output, can generate electricity up to 80% of their electrical 
capacity [20]. For example, if the electrical gross capacity of the plant is 100 MW and it 
operates at maximum heat output, it can develop only 80 MW in full power operation. 
The electricity generation in CHP plants is limited during cold seasons at high demand for 
district heating. 
Injected power in electricity grid depends on two more technical factors of a generating 
system: self-consumption and availability (Table 8). Self-consumption values (as a 
percentage of gross generator capacity) indicate the power output fraction which is 
consumed onsite in plant facilities and does not reach the electricity grid [20][43-46]. 
For pumped hydro storage technology, self-consumption refers to losses in energy 
conversion: electrical – gravitational (and potential) – electrical. 
Availability of a power generator in Table 8 is expressed in percentage terms, and 
indicates the fraction of time when the generator is able to generate electricity: for 
instance, an offshore wind turbine with an availability of 97% is able to operate 97 days 
out of 100. The data for availability in Table 8 is obtained from various sources: 
[20][43][47-51]. 
 
4.5 Validation of the reference models 
To validate the reference models, first the power exchanges between Baltic States and 
the neighbouring countries are set, as indicated by the four cases selected for ENTSO-E’s 
system snapshots [15]. Next, the power exchange results between Baltic States are 
compared with ENTSO-E records (see Figure 7).  
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Figure 7 Validation of the reference models for selected scenarios (left column: results 
from reference model, right column: ENTSO-E physical flow snapshots [15]) 
To schedule the generation in each country, first unit commitment was performed. Due 
to thermal (heating) demands, cogeneration units were not allowed to switch off during 
the unit commitment procedure, unlike biomass/waste, coal and geothermal generators. 
Optimal power flow was then employed to create generation schedules in each country. 
The results can be used to indicate the market status of each country by locational 
marginal cost. As the price of the energy exchange between the neighbouring countries 
and the Baltic States was not a focus of this study, fictitious prices were assumed to only 
express the economic preferences with whom power exchanges may be schedule under 
different system load and generation conditions. Thus, the resulting system marginal 
cost can only be used to indicate the relative comparisons of market status for each 
country, rather than reveal the electricity costs in the Baltic States. Further, onshore 
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wind farms were assumed to produce 30% of the rated capacity, while 40% was 
assumed for offshore wind farms to consider the average availability of wind generation 
[42].  
It is manifest that by applying the method described above, we get very similar intra-
Baltic-states flows for the four reference models (left column of Figure 7). The maximum 
difference of the cross boarder flow in the reference models, compared with ENTSO-E’s 
system snapshots, is around 1%. 
In the following sub-sections, on the top of the four reference scenarios we build the 
future model for the 2020 and 2030 horizons. The same methods used to validate the 
reference models are adopted for the analysis of the future scenarios. 
 
4.6 Developing the models to the 2020 and 2030 horizons 
After calibrating the models for the current scenarios, and validating them by the 
ENTSO-E snapshots, the network models, loads and generation patterns for the future 
horizons (i.e., 2020 and 2030.) were constructed To achieve this, the original model 
was modified as follows. 
 Addition of network reinforcement projects 
 Estimation of expected load increase patterns 
 Inclusion of new generation unit 
 
4.6.1 Network development projects 
The extension of the current network into the future scenarios was performed based on 
the projects published in the Ten-Year Network Development Plan 2014 of ENTSO-E 
[52], and by BEMIP [53], as well as on the information published on the website of each 
TSO in the Baltic States, such as Litgrid and Elering. The projects considered for the 
extension of the current network are listed in Table A-1. It should be noted that the High 
Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) circuits are used only to connect Baltic power systems to 
external systems, and in our model the equivalent external systems are modelled by one 
single bus at the terminal of each circuit. Therefore, it makes no difference to model 
these circuits as HVDC lines or AC transmission lines. The flexible control advantages of 
the HVDC lines were then modelled by the connected equivalent generators. 
Two types of transmission lines were assumed for the 330 kV circuits, i.e. 3x300 mm2 
and 3x400mm2 [52]; whereas for the 110kV circuits, 2x240 mm2 [54] was assumed. 
According to the international standards CEI 61089-1991 widely used in Europe, by 
assuming the average operation temperature is 5 °C [54] in Baltic States, the 
transmission line parameters can be derived (see Table 9). 
Table 9 Technical data of the planned transmission lines 
Type Voltage [kV] R [Ω/km] X [Ω/km] B [µS/km] 
3x300 330 0.0289 0.289 3.569 
3x400 330 0.0228 0.286 3.598 
2x240 110 0.0550 0.272 3.820 
 
4.6.2 Load growth 
The construction of the future load scenarios in 2020 and 2030 was based on the data 
from ENTSO-E in their annual Scenario Outlook & Adequacy Forecast (SOAF) report. As 
the load forecast data was not available for 2030 in the latest version, i.e. SOAF 2015 
[55], the data for load growth was obtained from two successive SOAF reports, i.e., the 
2015 version [55] for scenario 2020 and the 2014-2030 version [4] for scenario 2030. 
Moreover, in order to differentiate the load increase rate in each country, Vision 1 of the 
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2030 scenario from the ENTSO-E report was selected, which employed data from each 
TSO. The load increasing rate for each Baltic state is listed in Table 10. 
Table 10 Load increasing rate in the Baltic States for 2020 and 2030 (%) 
Country 2020 2030 
Estonia 2.26 27.82 
Lithuania 1.69 5.90 
Latvia 8.36 38.34 
Total 3.97 22.64 
The load for horizons 2020 and 2030 was scaled up according to the national increase 
rates listed above, while the spatial distribution and individual percentage for each load 
were kept unchanged as in the reference models. 
 
4.6.3 Generation expansion projects 
Modelling the expansion of generation capacity is more than just adding up the total 
number of additional installed generation units. It is essential to correctly locate the new 
commissioned/decommissioned large generation units and their connecting substations. 
Therefore, the BEMIP [53] and ENTSO-E’s SOAF reports were used to identify projects 
concerning large units [55]. In contrast, to identify the location of the renewable 
generation units, especially wind parks, multiple resources were used (e.g. material from 
the Estonian wind power association [56], etc.) However, since most of the wind 
generation projects have not been confirmed yet, a couple of the proposed projects were 
selected into the model to simulate the increase in wind power in the considered time 
horizon. Thus, the following general assumptions were made for the projects not yet 
confirmed: 1) increased wind capacity in Latvia would be connected to two 330kV 
stations, i.e. Ventspils and Liepaja; 2) increased wind capacity in Estonia would mainly 
be offshore and connected to the Kanapeeksi substation in the island of Hiiumaa. It 
should be noted that the selected wind projects were only used to match the energy mix 
in the future horizons and therefore cannot be considered as liable information. The 
modelled generation projects are listed in the Annex (Table A-2.) Given that 
waste/biomass generators are usually small and mainly used locally, the generation 
capacity was subtracted directly from the loads with an assumed average load factor for 
each country [57]. The increases in other types of generation capacity were averagely 
shared among existing units of the same type and considered as results of improved 
efficiency or renovation of old units. The generation mix in 2020 and 2030 employed in 
the model was taken from the EU report on energy, transport and emissions trends [57]. 
Furthermore, the following general assumptions were made: 
 The hydro pump station works as a load during the off-peak load period, but 
as a generator during the peak load period; 
 In the summer, the maximum hydro generation will only be 50% in the peak 
hours to simulate the low water situation [58], while during the off-peak 
hours, the generation will be 0 in Latvia to simulate the fact that water is 
stored for peak hours.  
The emergency power reserve for each Baltic country was assumed as 700MW [59], 250 
MW [60] and 400 MW [42] for Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia, respectively.  
The RAC, a percentage of total installed capacity which can be operated reliably 
(including the maintenance, scheduled outage, unavailable capacity), was also 
considered for different seasons in 2020 [55] and 2030 [1]. Table 11 reports the 
percentage of reliable available capacities in the extended models.  
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Table 11 Availability of generation capacity for horizon 2020 and 2030 (%) 
Country 
2020 2030 
Winter Summer Winter Summer 
Estonia 69.57 69.22 76.15 76.15 
Latvia 52.24 42.31 72.03 58.84 
Lithuania 57.36 34.5 44.56 33.67 
 
5. Reference scenarios analysis  
In this section, economic and security analyses of the Baltic power systems based on the 
reference models are reported. The objective of the economic analyses is to understand 
the competitiveness of the Baltic States among themselves in the electricity markets, 
while capturing the impacts from the network infrastructures (such as congestions, and 
voltage limits) on their market merits. 
Generation mix for each scenario is defined by the optimal power flow. The objective of 
the optimal power flow is to minimize generation cost in the electricity system based on 
the marginal cost of each generator, considering grid constraints such as transmission 
line limits and voltage range. In the following sections the marginal cost for each Baltic 
country is given in terms of locational marginal cost, so that possible zonal splitting due 
to grid congestions can be identified. 
Further, contingency analysis performed on the basis of the four reference models is 
meant to check for the operational security of the systems, and the adequacy of 
resources available to the TSO in charge to handle such contingencies. The results can 
also be used to identify the criticalities of the system under different generation and load 
conditions. These are ranked by a set of metrics such as maximum overload percentage, 
maximum voltage violation percentage, number of violations, islanded generation and 
load, etc.  
 
5.1 Economic analysis 
For the simulated winter off-peak case, the simulation indicated an overall of 1.2 GW 
import into the Baltic States (see Figure 7); however, Estonia and Latvia were net 
exporting countries (mainly to Russia) with around 63 MW and 132 MW net respectively. 
Lithuania was the only country with a huge net import of 1392 MW, while the load of 
Lithuania at that time was 1001 MW; therefore, through the simulation results, we can 
observe that the Kruonis pump station was pumping water into the reservoir.  
In the winter peak case, the overall load increased by more than 50% compared with 
the winter off-peak case. The power imports of the Baltic States totalled 788 MW, 
representing a decrease of more than one third compared with the winter off-peak case. 
Only Latvia kept net export of 146 MW, while Estonia and Lithuania imported 152 and 
762 MW, respectively. According to our simulation, the Kruonis pump station was 
discharging water to satisfy its domestic loads, thus setting a comparatively low 
marginal cost for Lithuania. 
With only 144 MW, the imported power of the Baltic States was low for the summer off-
peak case. This amounted to a 90% decrease w.r.t. the winter off-peak case. Estonia 
and Latvia were exporting countries in this scenario, reaching 706 MW and 94 MW 
respectively. Lithuania was the only country with a huge net import of around 950 MW, 
while the load of Lithuania was only around 850 MW. The simulation results indicated 
that the Kruonis pump station was pumping waters into the reservoir, like in the winter 
off-peak case. 
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Compared to the summer off-peak case, the load increased by more than 50% during 
summer peak, but was around 20% lower than in both the winter cases. In this 
reference model, the total imported power of the Baltic States was 475 MW, more than 
three times higher than in the summer off-peak case. Only Lithuania kept net import of 
754 MW while Estonia and Latvia exported 256 and 23 MW, respectively. 
Figure 8 illustrates the system marginal cost in the four reference models described 
above. For the winter off-peak case, the marginal cost in Estonia was higher than in the 
other two countries, while Latvia and Lithuania had similar marginal cost. Latvia can 
mainly use renewables (hydro and wind) to cover the demand; yet more expensive 
cogeneration units based on oil/gas were running at their minimum level for district 
heating. Due to the large amount of import into Lithuania and the maintenance minimum 
operation requirements of cogeneration plants, the hydro pump storage was operating 
almost at its maximum. Estonia used many shale oil generators due to the lack of 
cheaper resources; therefore, its marginal cost was the highest among the three Baltic 
States. 
 
  
Winter off-peak Winter peak 
  
Summer off-peak Summer peak 
Figure 8 System marginal cost of the four reference models 
For the winter peak case, the marginal cost of each state was similar to the winter off-
peak case. Combining the results of both cases in winter, it is obvious that Latvia has 
stronger market advantage compared with the other two Baltic States due to zero 
marginal cost of hydro power plants. The strategy of Lithuania for using the hydro pump 
station to shift the generation resources from off-peak to peak loads successfully 
decreased its marginal cost for domestic generation. 
For the summer off-peak case, with low demand the renewable resources cannot be fully 
exploited due to thermal power plants. For example, not all hydro power plants in Latvia 
reach their maximum outputs. To balance the import and generation from domestic 
thermal units in Lithuania, the pump station also worked at its maximum to store water 
into the reservoir. 
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For the summer peak case, the locational marginal cost varied from region to region in 
Latvia and Lithuania. Marginal cost in Latvia’s Riga area were driven up to the same level 
as Estonia by frequent episodes of congestion in that region, whose effects were felt as 
far as in parts of Lithuania. This is mainly caused by limited maximum power of the 
hydro power plants in Latvia (50% of the gross electrical capacity) due to low water 
inflows in the River Daugava during summer season. 
 
5.2 Steady state security analysis 
Figure 9 shows the system physical features for the four reference models. They were 
also used as the starting operational points to perform n-1 steady state contingency 
analysis in the latter part of this sub-section. Under the contingency analysis the 
participation factors of the automatic generation control of generators in the Baltic 
States as a whole were set proportional to the installed capacity of the generators. 
Emergency power reserves for each country are activated when necessary under the 
contingency analysis. 
In the winter off-peak case one of the Estlink cables (Estlink 1 in our simulation) was 
used to export a very small amount of energy to Finland, while the other one was used 
to import energy from Finland. As a consequence, Estlink 2 was used up to 96% of its 
capacity.  
For the winter peak case, according to the simulation results, the Estonia’s system 
experienced situation of comparatively low voltage, due to the lack of reactive power 
support under high demand. However, the voltage was still in the acceptable operational 
range.  
For the summer off-peak case, the system voltage in Estonia was better than for the 
winter cases because of lower exchanges through the DC lines (Estlink 1 and 2), 
involving less need for reactive compensation from the system.  
For the summer peak case, power flows in the area southeast of Riga reached the 
operational limits of the transmission lines, with congestion occurring correspondingly. 
Similarly to the previous cases, voltage in Estonia was affected by the exchange of 
power on Estlink 1.  
Based on the operational points listed in Figure 9 for the four reference models, 
contingency sets containing each single transmission line, transformer and generator in 
the models were applied for the steady state security analysis lists the most severe 
contingencies according to each criterion in the table.   
Table 12 Selected most critical contingencies according to multiple criteria for the four 
reference cases 
Cases 
Contingency 
component  
Most severe 
consequence  
Violations 
Unserved 
loads (MW) 
Disconnected 
generation 
(MW) 
Maximum 
overload 
(%) 
Minimum 
Voltage 
(p.u.)  
Winter 
off-peak  
contingency 1   
System wide 
disturbance 
- - - - - 
contingency 2 Low voltage 43 0 0 - 0.87 
contingency 3 Overload 35 0 0 165 0.84 
contingency 4 Disc. Gen. 0 0 596 - - 
contingency 5 Uns. loads 0 10.26 0 - - 
Winter 
peak 
contingency 6 Low voltage 114 0 135 109.7 0.792 
contingency 3 Overload 75 0 0 268 0.745 
contingency 4 Disc. Gen. 65 0 200 117.3 0.88 
contingency 5 Uns. loads 65 17 0 116.7 0.879 
Summer 
off-peak 
contingency 7 Low voltage 3 0 0 141.3 0.898 
contingency 8 Disc. Gen. 0 0 105.3 - - 
contingency 5 Uns. loads 0 12.95 0 - - 
contingency 9 Overload 0 0 0 165 - 
Summer 
peak 
contingency 3 Overload 36 0 0 158.7 0.865 
contingency 10 Overload 2 0 0 244.8 - 
contingency 4 Disc. Gen. 2 0 126 126.4 - 
contingency 11 Low voltage 8 0 0 132.7 0.835 
contingency 5 Uns. loads 0 21.12 0 131.3 - 
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Figure 9 System performances for the four reference models under normal operation 
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For the winter off-peak case, the most serious contingency was the loss of a branch in 
contingency 1, which resulted in system-wide disturbance. The loss of component in 
contingency 3 created the highest overloads in the contingency set and also caused the 
lowest system voltage. The highest number of violations can be observed when the 
component in contingency 2 failed; however, the consequences were not so serious. The 
fault on the component in contingency 4 cut the largest import of 596 MW to the Baltic 
States; however, no system violations were observed. 
For the winter peak case, no system-wide disturbance was witnessed. The worst 
contingency was to lose the component in contingency 3, which not only caused 2.7 
times higher power flow than the maximum allowed flow over some lines, but also 
heavily lowered system voltage. 
For the summer off-peak case, no system-wide disturbance occurred. The system’s 
resilience under this reference case was the highest among all the four cases. The most 
severe one was the tripping of the component in contingency 7, which can bring 40% 
excessive flows over other lines. All other contingencies left the system largely 
unaffected. 
For the summer peak case, no system-wide disturbance was observed. The most severe 
contingency was the loss of the component in contingency 10, which caused about 150% 
excessive current in a line, which had already been operating near the maximum limit in 
the normal state. Even though low bus voltage was detected, the consequences were not 
as serious as the winter peak case.     
Obviously, the most critical components in the system were the ones in contingency 1 
(which can cause system-wide disturbance in case of high demand) and contingency 3 
(whose fault sets off system overload in every reference case). Other faults caused by 
network components not directly pertaining to our focus are not listed here. 
 
6. Perspective models for horizon 2020 
The reference models were extended into the future through the analysis of the 2020 
and 2030 horizons. Based on the extended models for 2020, we will briefly discuss in 
this section the economic and security aspects (with special regard to the system’s 
operational security under a specific scenario of geopolitical security concerning the 
IPS/UPS network) and the issues concerning energy independency of the Baltic States. 
To achieve the objectives, a general scenario was assumed: zero electricity exchange 
between the Baltic States and IPS/UPS. In this scenario zero power flows are with both 
Russia and Belarus. The Baltic States remain connected with Finland, Poland and Sweden 
through cross-border transmission lines. Interconnections with Kaliningrad are kept 
unchanged. 
 
6.1 Economic analysis 
As previously described, the system models do not include a market model for the future 
scenarios; therefore, cross-border exchange patterns were not derived endogenously, 
but simply imposed by assumption of the following pecking order for electricity trading: 
1) Finland, 2) Sweden, 3) Poland, and 4) Kaliningrad. The order was based on the 
average costs of the energy mix of each country. Furthermore, in order to study the 
energy independency of the Baltic States, higher prices were set for the import from 
outside, while export prices were set to zero.  
Figure 10 gives the results of the energy exchanges between neighbouring countries in 
the Baltic. The results are provided for the four typical cases already seen in the 
previous sections. It can be noted that energy exchanges with outside countries were 
practically zero, which indicates that the Baltic States can satisfy their demand locally in 
2020 in all four reference cases. 
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Figure 10 Energy independence levels and system marginal prices of the Baltic States  
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For the winter off-peak case, Estonia and Latvia provided 470 MW and 215 MW export to 
Lithuania as in the previous cases. Due to congestions in the north-eastern part of 
Estonia, the locational marginal cost varied slightly in that area. The buses’ marginal 
cost ranged from 0 €2013/MWh to 29.3 €2013/MWh and the average marginal cost was 
26.6 €2013/MWh with a standard deviation of 1.7 €2013/MWh.  
For the winter peak case, Estonia exported 306 MW and 115 MW to Latvia and Lithuania, 
respectively. Like in the previous case, congestions can be observed in a small area near 
Riga and in the northeast of Estonia as well. The buses’ marginal cost ranged from 
0 €2013/MWh to 38.7 €2013/MWh, while the average marginal cost was 35.3 €2013/MWh 
with a standard deviation of 2.2 €2013/MWh. Like in the previous cases, the hydro pump 
station was discharging the water for generating electricity; therefore, it effectively 
lowered the costs for the peak hours. 
For the summer off-peak case, Estonia exported 63 MW and 241 MW to Latvia and 
Lithuania, respectively. The buses’ marginal cost ranged from 0 €2013/MWh to 
39.5 €2013/MWh and the average marginal cost was 35.8 €2013/MWh with a standard 
deviation of 2.2 €2013/MWh. The system marginal cost were even higher than that in the 
winter peak case, due to the fact that the hydro units in Latvia were switched off to 
reserve water for the peak hours.  
The summer peak case presented huge exports from Estonia (767MW) to Latvia 
(391MW) and Lithuania (376MW). Congestions can be detected at the southeast of Riga, 
while the north-eastern part of Estonia provided counter-flows to alleviate the 
congestion. Therefore, cost increases occurred in the western part of Latvia and 
Lithuania, whereas Estonia maintained comparatively low costs. The buses’ marginal cost 
ranged from 0 €2013/MWh to 53.8 €2013/MWh, with an average marginal cost of 
31.4 €2013/MWh and a standard deviation of 4.4 €2013/MWh. 
 
6.2 Steady state security analysis 
Figure 11 shows the system’s physical features for the four extended models for 2020. 
These were also used as the starting points to perform n-1 steady state contingency 
analysis in the latter part of this sub-section. 
Under the four simulated configurations of load and generation, network system voltages 
were in quite acceptable ranges during normal operation. System congestions can be 
mainly spotted in the northeast of Estonia and the vicinities of Riga. As in the four 
reference models, the voltage of Estonia was generally lower than in the other two 
countries.  
Table 13 Most critical contingencies according to multiple criteria for the four extended 
models in 2020 
Cases 
Contingency 
component  
Most severe 
consequence  
Violations 
Unserved 
loads 
(MW) 
Disconnected 
generation 
(MW) 
Maximum 
overload 
(%) 
Minimum 
Voltage 
(p.u.)  
Winter 
off-peak  
contingency 12 Disc. Gen. 0 0 12.17 - - 
contingency 11 Low voltage 5 0 0 - 0.848 
contingency 3 Overload 32 0 0 167.3 0.872 
contingency 5 Uns. loads 0 15.42 0 - - 
Winter 
peak 
contingency 3 Num. violations 60 0 0 129 0.826 
contingency 3 Overload 13 0 0 279 0.755 
contingency 11 Low voltage 9 0 0 - 0.702 
contingency 5 Uns. loads 0 24.59 0 - - 
contingency 13 Disc. Gen. 0 0 19.33 - - 
Summer 
off-peak 
contingency 14 Overload 2 0 0 139 - 
contingency 15 Overload 3 0 0 132.1 - 
Line Vao-Loo2 Disc. Gen. 0 0 12.11 - - 
contingency 5 Uns. loads 0 13.17 0 - - 
Summer 
peak 
contingency 3 Overload 34 0 0 168.6 0.865 
contingency 13 Disc. Gen. 0 0 18.89 - - 
contingency 11 Low voltage 6 0 0 - 0.826 
contingency 5 Uns. loads 0 21.48 0 - - 
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Figure 11 System performances for the four cases in 2020 under normal operation 
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Based on the operational points listed in Figure 11 for the four extended models of 2020, 
contingency sets containing each single transmission line, transformer and generator in 
the models were applied for steady state security analysis. Table 13 lists the most 
severe contingencies according to each criterion in the table. 
As can be gleaned from Table 13, the system’s operational security levels were not as 
severe as for the reference cases. No element able to cause system-wide disturbance 
has been detected.    
For the winter off-peak case, the most serious contingency was the loss of the 
component in contingency 3, which created the highest number of violations and the 
highest overloads in the contingency set. The failure of the component in contingency 11 
caused the lowest system voltage. 
For the winter peak case the worst contingency was the failure of component in 
contingency 3, which not only caused 2.8 times higher power flows than the maximum 
allowed over other lines, but also heavily lowered the system voltage. The loss of the 
component in contingency 2 brought the largest number of violations; however, the 
consequences were not as serious as what followed the fault of the component in 
contingency 3. 
For the summer off-peak case the system displayed the highest resilience among all the 
four cases. The most severe case was the tripping of the component in contingency 14, 
which is able bring about 39% of excess flows.  
For the summer peak case the most severe contingency was the loss of the component 
in contingency 3, which caused about 69% excessive current over a line in the system.     
The most critical components in the system were still the component in contingency 3 
(which resulted in system overload in most cases if it had fault). Of course, there are 
other network components that are critical as well. For the sake of spaces, we do not list 
them. 
 
7. Perspective models for horizon 2030 
The models were further extended through 2030. Beside all the assumptions and 
methods already adopted (both in the reference and 2020 cases) we assumed that the 
nuclear generator in Lithuania was not a subjected to the RAC constraint. Therefore, the 
nuclear generator was always assumed to be available up to the maximum capacity 
(minus its own self-consumption). 
 
7.1 Economic analysis 
The assumption of higher importing prices and zero exporting prices of the Baltic States 
implied that, unless absolutely necessary to maintain the operation of the system, power 
exchanges with the neighbouring countries would not be observed. However, with the 
operation of the nuclear power plant in Lithuania, generation adequacy will be greatly 
increased in the Baltic States. During some off-peak cases, export to outside countries 
can be observed even at zero prices, simply to maintain the operation of the system. 
The nuclear unit would also bring about much lower system marginal cost during most of 
the time (uncongested/slightly congested situations). Figure 12 shows the resulting 
power exchange patterns and the corresponding system marginal cost. 
From Figure 12, it is obvious that the cross-border power exchanges reversed their 
directions completely compared with the 2020 situation. 
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Figure 12 Energy independence levels and system marginal prices of the Baltic States   
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Estonia became a net importing country in the winter off-peak case, with 51 MW and 
36 MW from Latvia and Lithuania respectively. Due to the congestions in the north-
eastern part of Estonia, the locational marginal cost varied slightly in that area. The 
buses’ marginal cost ranged from 0 €2013/MWh to 3.3 €2013/MWh and the average 
marginal cost was 3.0 €2013/MWh, with a standard deviation of 0.2 €2013/MWh. 
For the winter peak case, Estonia imported 39 MW and 485 MW to Latvia and Lithuania, 
respectively. Congestions can be observed in a small area near Riga, as well as in the 
north-west of Estonia. The buses’ marginal cost ranged from 0 €2013/MWh to 
74.2 €2013/MWh and the average marginal cost was 28.4 €2013/MWh, with a standard 
deviation of 10.1 €2013/MWh. The network congestion in this case greatly affected the 
system’s economic performance and the marginal cost of some areas. 
For the summer off-peak case, Latvia imported 333 MW and 113 MW to Estonia and 
Lithuania, respectively. Further, due to low load in the Baltic States, export to 
Kaliningrad can be observed even with zero prices. The buses’ marginal cost was 
0 €2013/MWh.  
For the summer peak case, exports were witnessed from Lithuania (255MW) to Latvia 
(138MW) and Estonia (116MW). Congestions can be detected in the north-eastern part 
of EE. The buses’ marginal cost ranged from 0 €2013/MWh to 3.3 €2013/MWh, while the 
average marginal cost was 3.0 €2013/MWh with a standard deviation of 0.2 €2013/MWh.  
 
7.2 Steady state security analysis 
Figure 13 shows the system’s physical features of the four extended models for 2030. 
These were also used as the starting points to perform n-1 steady state contingency 
analysis in the latter part of this sub-section.  
Similarly to the 2020 and reference models, the system voltages under normal operation 
were within the standard operational range (0.95 to 1.05 p.u.). Congestions may occur 
at most times in the northern part of Estonia; occasionally, the area at the southeast of 
Riga may also join in. Estonia had generally lower voltage than the other two countries, 
and during the off-peak periods, the system voltage would be higher than that prevailing 
at peak periods.     
Table 14 Most critical contingencies according to multiple criteria for the four cases in 
2030 
Cases 
Contingency 
component  
Most severe 
consequence  
Violations 
Unserved 
loads 
(MW) 
Disconnected 
generation 
(MW) 
Maximum 
overload 
(%) 
Minimum 
Voltage 
(p.u.)  
Winter 
off-peak  
contingency 16 Disc. Gen. 0 0 928.2 - - 
contingency 2 Num. violations 45 0 0 115 0.868 
contingency 11 Low voltage 6 0 0 - 0.799 
contingency 5 Uns. loads 0 16.07 0 - - 
contingency 3 Overload 36 0 0 236 0.817 
Winter 
peak 
contingency 2 Num. violations 35 0 0 142.9 0.811 
contingency 9 Overload 4 0 0 161.2 - 
contingency 11 Low voltage 9 0 0 102 0.59 
contingency 5 Uns. Loads 0 25.61 0 - - 
contingency 16 Disc. Gen. 0 0 1286.22 - - 
Summer 
off-peak 
contingency 14 Overload 2 0 0 150.5 - 
contingency 16 Disc. Gen. 1 0 928.2 115.2 - 
contingency 5 Uns. loads 0 13.72 0 - - 
Summer 
peak 
contingency 3 Overload 37 0 0 243.8 0.808 
contingency 16 Disc. Gen. 0 0 928.2 - - 
contingency 11 Low voltage 8 0 0 - 0.786 
contingency 5 Uns. loads 0 22.37 0 - - 
contingency 2 Num. violations 50 0 0 119.1 0.861 
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Figure 13 System performance for the four extended models for 2030 under normal 
operation 
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Based on the operational points listed in Figure 13 for the four models of 2030, 
contingency sets containing each single transmission line, transformer and generator in 
the models were applied for the steady state security analysis. Table 14 lists the most 
severe contingencies according to each criterion in the table. No system-wide 
disturbance was witnessed in the analysed cases. 
For the winter off-peak case, the most serious contingency was the loss of the 
component in contingency 3 which created the highest overloads in the contingency set. 
Even though the highest number of violations can be observed when the component in 
contingency 2 failed, the consequences were not particularly serious. 
For the winter peak case the worst overload contingency was due to the loss of the 
component in contingency 9, which caused power flows 60% in excess of the maximum 
allowed over some lines in the system. However, the most serious problem occurred 
with the fault of the component in contingency 11, which brought about the lowest 
system voltage (0.59 p.u.), at which system operation is practically unviable, causing 
difficulties as severe as a system wide disturbance. 
For the summer off-peak case system resilience was at peak among all the four cases. 
The most severe problem was the tripping of the component in contingency 14, which 
can set off 50% excessive flows. Other contingencies did not create serious problems to 
the system. 
For the summer peak case, like in the winter off-peak case, the most serious 
contingency was the loss of the component in contingency 3, which created the highest 
overloads in the contingency set. Failure of the component in contingency 11 determined 
the lowest system voltage (0.78 p.u.) in the contingency set. 
Obviously, the most critical components in the system were the component in 
contingency 11 (which can cause un-operationally low voltage in the winter peak case) 
and the component in contingency 3 (which , when failing, may in some cases result in 
system overload). Of course, there are other network components that are critical as 
well, which are not listed for the sake of concision. 
 
8. Baltic States without nuclear in 2030 
The issue of the construction of the new nuclear power plant has not been entirely 
clarified yet. In this section, we simulate the system without the construction of the 
nuclear reactor in 2030. Other assumptions are still holding as before. 
 
8.1 Economic analysis 
Without nuclear reactor the power exchange with the neighbouring countries was again 
practically zero. The cross-border power flows and relative system marginal cost under 
four typical load conditions can be found in Figure 14. The system marginal cost became 
comparatively high again. The hydro pump stations in Lithuania were modelled as load 
during the off-peak hours for pumping water into the reservoir. This caused the power 
flow from north to the south. In contrast, during the winter peak hours, the power flow 
reversed.  
For the winter off-peak case, Lithuania became a net importer, with 124 MW and 
692 MW from Estonia and Latvia respectively. The generation in the north-eastern part 
of Estonia provided counter-flows to relieve system congestion, with locational marginal 
cost became zero at those buses. Therefore, the buses’ marginal cost ranged from 
0 €2013/MWh to 50.8 €2013/MWh, while the average marginal cost was 25.6 €2013/MWh 
with a standard deviation of 2.9 €2013/MWh. 
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Figure 14 System performance for the four extended models for 2030 without nuclear 
generation 
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For the winter peak case, Lithuania exported 485 MW to Estonia through Latvia. 
Congestions can be observed in a small area near Riga and in the north-west of Estonia. 
The buses’ marginal cost ranged from 0 €2013/MWh to 73.5 €2013/MWh and the average 
marginal cost was 28.3 €2013/MWh with a standard deviation of 8.8 €2013/MWh. The 
network congestion in this case greatly affected the system economic performances and 
the marginal cost of some areas. 
For the summer off-peak case, huge exports from Estonia can be observed, namely 
326 MW and 408 MW to Latvia and Lithuania, respectively. The buses’ marginal cost 
ranged from 0 €2013/MWh to 33.5 €2013/MWh and the average marginal cost was 
31.8 €2013/MWh with a standard deviation of 3.4 €2013/MWh. Due to the congestions at 
the cross-border transmission interface between Latvia and Estonia, the zonal splitting 
naturally occurred in this case.  
For the summer peak case, export were witnessed from Estonia (605 MW) to Latvia 
(24 MW) and Estonia (580 MW). Congestions can be detected to the north-eastern part 
of Estonia and the area near Riga. The buses’ marginal cost range from 0 €2013/MWh to 
60.5 €2013/MWh and the average marginal cost was 29.8 €2013/MWh with a standard 
deviation of 3.7 €2013/MWh. 
 
8.2 Steady state security analysis 
Figure 15 shows the system physical features of the 4 extended models for 2030 without 
the nuclear reactor. They were also used as the starting points to perform n-1 steady 
state contingency analysis in the latter part of this sub-section.  
Similarly to the previous cases, the system voltages under normal operation were within 
the standard range (0.95 to 1.05 p.u.). Congestions can occur in the northern part of 
Estonia at most times; they sometimes extend to the southeast of Riga. In general, 
Estonia had lower voltage than the other two countries, but compared with the previous 
cases, the system voltage in normal operation was not as high as when having the 
nuclear generator.     
Based on the operational points listed in Figure 15 for the four models of 2030 without 
nuclear generation, contingency sets containing each single transmission line, 
transformer and generator in the models were applied for the steady state security 
analysis. Table 14 lists the most severe contingencies according to each criterion in the 
table.  
Table 15 Most critical contingencies according to multiple criteria for the four cases 
without nuclear generator 
Cases 
Contingency 
component  
Most severe 
consequence  
Violations 
Unserved 
loads 
(MW) 
Disconnected 
generation 
(MW) 
Maximum 
overload 
(%) 
Minimum 
Voltage 
(p.u.)  
Winter 
off-peak  
contingency 18 Disc. Gen. 0 0 13.83 - - 
contingency 2 Num. violations 45 0 0 115 0.867 
contingency 11 Low voltage 6 0 0 - 0.799 
contingency 5 Uns. loads 0 16.07 0 - - 
contingency 3 Overload 36 0 0 236 0.817 
Winter 
peak 
contingency 2 Num. violations 34 0 0 142.7 0.811 
contingency 9 Overload 3 0 0 161.2 - 
contingency 11 Low voltage 9 0 0 102.5 0.593 
contingency 5 Uns. Loads 0 25.61 0 - - 
contingency 18 Disc. Gen. 0 0 23.91 - - 
Summer 
off-peak 
contingency 14 Overload 2 0 0 150.5 - 
contingency 12 Disc. Gen. 0 0 13.33 - - 
contingency 5 Uns. loads 0 13.72 0 - - 
Summer 
peak 
contingency 3 Overload 37 0 0 242.7 0.808 
contingency 18 Disc. Gen. 0 0 14.29 - - 
contingency 11 Low voltage 9 0 0 - 0.783 
contingency 5 Uns. loads 0 22.37 0 - - 
contingency 2 Num. violations 51 0 0 118.6 0.861 
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Figure 15 System performance for the four 2030 models without nuclear generator under 
normal operation 
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Compared with the case with a nuclear generator, the system security under n-1 
contingency did not change much. No system-wide disturbance was witnessed in the 
studied cases. 
For the winter off-peak case, the most serious contingency was still the loss of the 
component in contingency 3 which created the highest overloads in the contingency set. 
Even though the highest number of violations can be observed when the component in 
contingency 2 failed, but the consequences were not so serious. 
For the winter peak case the worst overload contingency was to lose the component in 
contingency 9, which caused also 60% higher power flow than the maximum allowed 
flow over other lines. However, the most serious problem happened when the 
component in contingency 11 failed, which brought the lowest voltage 0.593 p.u. in the 
system, at which the system cannot practically operate. It is as severe as system wide 
disturbance. 
For the summer off-peak case was most resilient among all the 4 cases. The most severe 
one was the tripping of the component in contingency 14, which can bring 50% 
excessive flows. Other contingencies did not create serious problem for the system. 
For the summer peak case, like in the winter off-peak case, the most serious 
contingency was the loss of the component in contingency 3 which created the highest 
overloads in the contingency set. Also, when the component in contingency 11 fails, it 
brought the lowest voltage 0.783 p.u.in the system. 
Obviously, the most critical components in the system were the one in contingency 11 
(which can cause un-operationally low voltage in the winter peak case) and the 
component in contingency 3 (which, when failing, resulted in system overload in some 
cases).  Further critical network components are not listed here for the sake of concision. 
 
9. Conclusions  
A power system model of the Baltic States has been developed with the purpose of 
assessing comparative options for a reliable and secure development of the region's 
electricity system. The model consists of buses with voltage of 110 kV and higher, 
mainly 110 kV, 220 kV and 330 kV. The 35 kV undersea cables connecting the Estonian 
mainland and the north-western islands were also included. The model has been 
calibrated based on the 2014 reference scenario to match the historical records from 
ENTSO-E. 
The cross-border power flows in the Baltic model are close to the recorded ENTSO-E data 
in winter off-peak load and summer peak load scenarios. The two additional scenarios of 
winter peak load and summer off-peak load were examined. Line loading and voltage 
levels within the Baltic States lie within the acceptable range in all 2014 reference 
scenarios. As a rule, the Baltic States exported electricity to mainland Russia, but 
imported it from Kaliningrad and Belarus. However, from the perspective of the Baltics, 
the dependence on Russia is fairly low as regards electric power. 
Lithuania’s network infrastructure is adequate and can sustain large quantity of 
imports. The hydro pump station is important for the shifting of generation resources, 
and thus plays a key role in reducing the system marginal cost. 
The Latvian power system enjoys considerable market advantages due to the high ratio 
of renewable energy - mainly hydro - in its electricity generation mix. In the reference 
scenario Latvia is a net exporter. However, the network seems not as adequate as that 
of Lithuania. Sometimes, congestion can cause the increase of the system marginal cost. 
The Estonian network may occasionally experience lower voltages compared with the 
other two Baltic State power systems, especially when the Estlinks (interconnecting 
Estonia with Finland) are under heavy load conditions. Reactive compensations may be 
needed, particularly around the area of Tallinn. Even though the installed wind turbine 
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capacity is the highest among the three Baltic States, this is still not enough to give 
Estonia the same strategic market position as Latvia. 
The analysis of the horizons 2020 and 2030 showed that the dependency of the Baltic 
States on foreign electricity production is fairly low, provided that the expansion of 
generation resources goes ahead as planned. 
The cross-border transmission corridors inside the Baltic States are sufficient to sustain 
the electricity consumption patterns assumed in the scenarios under the current study; 
however, the internal network reinforcement projects should be fostered in order to 
remove congestions, especially in the northern part of Estonia and in the area at the 
south-west of Riga. 
Nuclear generation in Lithuania can greatly improve security of electricity supply in the 
Baltic States; even in its absence, however, the Baltic States can still count on 
alternatives for power generation, although with a decreased security margin. 
The current report provides insight on the ability of the Baltic States to operate their 
electricity systems independently; furthermore, it paves the ground for more detailed 
market analyses, expected to be conducted with tailored market/power dispatch tools to 
be eventually combined/interlinked with the currently utilised power flow models. 
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Annex 
Table A-1 Network reinforcement projects 
No. Project name Countri
es 
Included 
in 
scenarios 
Voltage 
level (kV) 
Length 
(kM) 
GTC 
contribution 
(MW) 
1 Harku-Lihula-Sindi EE 2020 330/110 140 500 
2 Kilingi-Nõmme - Riga TEC II  EE-LV 2020 330/110  16 500 
3 OHL between Alytus and PL-
LT border 
LT-PL 2020 400 51 500 
4 Alytus-Kruonis LT  2020 330 53 500 
5 Klaipeda-Telsiai LT  2020 330 85 700 
6 Klaipeda-Nybro LT-SE 2020 300 440 700 
7 Grobina -Imanta LV 2020 330 380 800 
8 Tartu-Sindi EE 2020 330/110 162 600 
9 Visaginas-Kruonis LT  2030 330 200 600 
10 Vilnius-Neris LT 2030 330 50 600 
11 Panevezys -Musa LT  2030 330 80 700 
12 Sindi-Paide EE 2030 330 75* 200 
13 Tartu-Valmiera EE 2030 330 128* 200 
14 Tsirguliina-Valmiera EE 2030 330 60* 200 
15 Balti-Tartu EE 2030 330 164* 200 
16 Eesti-Tsirguliina EE 2030 330 238* 200 
17 TEC2-Salaspils LV 2030 330 14* 600 
18 TEC1-TEC2 LV 2030 330 12* 600 
19 Viskali-Musa LV-LT 2030 330 138 600 
20 Aizkraukle-Panevezys LV-LT 2030 330 123* 600 
*Estimated by the authors according to the existing 110kV lines 
Table A-2 Considered new power plant installations in Baltic States in 2020 and 2030 
No Country Project Fuel type Installed 
capacity 
(MW) 
location Considered 
in Scenario 
Note 
1 LV Kurzeme Coal/Biomass 400 Ventspils 2020 Depending 
on Visaginas 
NPP project 
2 LT Visaginas 
NPP 
Nuclear 1326 Visaginas 2030  
3 EE Baltic Blue Wind 420 Hiiumaa 2020 Off-shore 
4 LV Ventspils Wind 100 Ventspils 2020 On-shore 
5 LV Baltic 
Wind Park 
Wind 200 Liepaja 2020 Off-shore 
6 EE Baltic Blue Wind 400 Hiiumaa 2030 Off-shore 
7 LV Ventspils Wind 250 Ventspils 2030 Off-shore 
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